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Enryō Inoue’s Tetsugaku Issekiwa and Kitarō Nishida
Masato Shirai
Foreword
	 That	Enryō	Inoue’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa (“Philosophical Talks”) was	the	motivation	for	Kitarō	Nishida’s	philosophical	
aspirations	is	a	well-known	fact.	In	an	interview	that	is	contained	in	the	newly	published	complete	works	of	Nishida	,	he	made	
the	following	comment.
	 	 I	was	not	always	inclined	to	philosophy;	I	was	actually	considering	science,	but	then	a	man	named	Enryō	Inoue	handed	
out	a	small	pamphlet	called	Tetsugaku Issekiwa.	I	read	it	and	found	it	extremely	interesting;	it	motivated	me	to	gradually	
enter	the	field	of	philosophy.	(NKZ24-80)
	 It	appears	that	his	views	were	also	shared	with	his	disciples.	Masaaki	Kōsaka	reports:	“When	I	asked	the	teacher	what	
philosophical	books	he	had	read,	he	replied,	‘There	is	one	by	Enryō	Inoue	called	Tetsugaku Issekiwa.	Of	course	you	would	not	
know	it,	but	reading	that	book	left	a	lasting	impression	on	me.’	Of	course	I	do	not	know	contents	of	the	book	what	written	by	
such	a	scholar	of	mysterious,	nor	do	I	know	when	it	was	 that	 the	 teacher	read	 it”	(Kōsaka,	1947-1965:22).	According	to	
Michiko	Yusa,	Motomori	Kimura	reported	something	similar	(Yusa,	1998:42).	In	September	1888,	Nishida	enrolled	in	 the	
Department	of	Humanities	at	the	Fourth	Higher	School.	It	is	probable	that	Nishida,	who	lived	in	Kanazawa,	must	have	read	
Tetsugaku Issekiwa	 immediately	after	 it	was	published,	which	 then	 inspired	him	 to	change	his	 focus	 from	sciences	 to	
humanities,	as	he	claimed	in	his	interview1.
	 It	should	be	noted	here	that	Kōsaka,	who	was	born	in	1900	and	grew	up	in	the	Taisho	era,	had	not	read	the	first	issue	of	
Tetsugaku Issekiwa	and	was	completely	unfamiliar	with	its	contents;	whereas	Nishida	had	read	the	book	in-depth	as	a	student	
at	one	of	Kanazawa’s	Senior	High	Schools.	Nishida	even	mentioned	 to	Kōsaka,	“Of	course	you	would	not	know	of	 it.”	
Nevertheless,	Kōsaka	was	aware	of	Enryō	as	“the	scholar	of	mysterious,”	indicating	that	Enryō	was	known	to	Kōsaka	as	a	
prominent	figure	in	the	Yokaigaku	(the	study	of	the	supernatural).	This	suggests	that	Enryō’s	activities	were	widely	known	even	
at	a	time	when	his	philosophy	was	not	being	read.
	 Nishida	was	undoubtedly	influenced	by	Enryō’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa.	He	once	asked,	“What	philosophy	would	there	be	
without	problems	 in	 life?”	(NKZ6-428).	But	Nishida’s	question	addressed	 the	field	of	philosophy	as	a	whole,	not	 just	a	
worldview	or	ethics.	When	Nishida	was	a	professor	at	Kanazawa’s	 the	Fourth	Higher	School,	he	wrote	a	 letter	seeking	a	
position	at	 the	University	 in	Tokyo,	 in	which	he	repeatedly	pointed	out	his	“specialization	 in	metaphysics	and	 theory	of	
knowledge	or	Erkenntnislehre”	(NKZ19-134;	NKZ19-137);	 it	was	definitely	metaphysics	 that	Enryō	Inoue	expounded	in	
Tetsugaku Issekiwa2.
	 In	this	sense,	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	had	a	strong	influence	on	Nishida’s	philosophical	aspirations.	However,	scholars	have	
never	scrutinized	how	much	impact	this	work	had	on	the	contents	of	Nishida’s	philosophy.	Shinichi	Funayama	asserts	that	the	
“theory	of	phenomena	as	reality”	 inspired	by	Enryō	was	established	by	Tetsujirō	Inoue	and	perfected	by	Kitarō	Nishida3. 
However,	although	Nishida	was	always	grateful	and	 indebted	 to	Tetsujirō	 Inoue,	he	was	dismissive	of	his	philosophy4. 
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Consequently,	the	pedigree	of	theory	of	phenomena	as	reality	cannot	be	taken	as	a	simple	direct	line	from	Enryō	Inoue	through	
Tetsujirō	Inoue	to	Kitarō	Nishida.	It	is	necessary	first	of	all	to	elucidate	the	content	of	Enryō	Inoue’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa,	the	
catalyst	of	“theory	of	phenomena	as	reality.”
	 This	paper	examines	Enryō	Inoue’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	against	the	background	of	issues	described	above	(Section	1–3).	It	
goes	on	to	discuss	 the	 linkage	between	Enryō	Inoue’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	and	Kitarō	Nishida’s	An Inquiry into the Good 
(Section	4).
1. Examination of Tetsugaku Issekiwa (Volume 1)
 Tetsugaku Issekiwa	comprises	three	volumes	and	takes	the	form	of	a	dialogue.	All	three	volumes	are	based	on	discussions	
among	Enryō’s	disciples,	with	Enryō	passing	a	verdict	when	the	discussion	can	go	no	further.	Let	us	first	analyze	Volume	1	in	
detail	to	understand	the	basic	scheme	of	Enryō’s	philosophy.	
	 In	Volume	1,	titled	“Discussion	on	the	Relationship	between	the	world	of	material	and	world	of	mind,”	the	main	topic	is	a	
debate	between	monism	and	pluralism	(in	Enryō’s	words,	the	viewpoint	of	indiscrimination	vs.	discrimination).	This	debate	is	
between	two	characters—Ryōsui	and	Enzan—advocating	mentalist	monism	and	pluralism,	respectively.	Shinichi	Funayama	
stated	 that	Volume	1	 is	a	“dialogue	between	materialist	Enzan	and	mentalist	Ryōsui”	 (Funayama,	1959-1999:109),	and	
consequently	he	often	misinterprets	Enzan	as	a	materialist5	;	however,	Enzan	cannot	be	called	a	materialist,	because	his	outlook	
on	pluralism	incorporates	a	physical-mind	dualism	with	clear	distinctions	between	mind	and	matter6.	The	debate	is	clearly	
between	a	perspective	with	clear	distinctions	between	mind	and	matter	and	 that	of	mentalistic	monism;	 therefore,	 the	
relationship	between	the	world	of	material	and	world	of	mind	is	of	essence.
	 The	dialogue	begins	with	a	statement	by	Enzan	that	finite	existence	can	have	no	knowledge	of	a	world	of	infinite	time	and	
space.	Ryōsui,	the	advocate	of	mentalistic	monism,	begins	by	asserting	that	everything	can	be	known	because	everything	exists	
within	the	mind.	He	replied	that	“time	and	space	are	an	image	described	by	human	minds;	the	whole	world	exists	in	the	mind	
and	the	entirety	of	creation	is	a	representation	of	it”	(IES1-36).
	 As	a	basis	for	asserting	that	everything	exists	within	the	mind,	Ryōsui	points	out	that	all	things	are	composed	around	the	
five	senses:	sight,	hearing,	smell,	taste,	and	touch.	These	senses	cannot	hold	true	without	the	eyes,	ears,	nose,	tongue,	or	body;	
therefore,	all	things	are	nothing	more	than	phenomena	of	the	five	senses	(IES1-36).	Even	the	idea	that	something	exists	outside	
the	mind	at	 this	moment	is	a	conjecture	by	the	mind	itself	 that	“something	exists	outside”;	even	the	idea	that	something	is	
unknown	emanates	from	the	result	of	a	thinking	process	that	“something	is	unknown.”	Consequently,	it	can	be	said	that	“there	
is	nothing	outside	of	the	mind”	(IES1-38).
	 However,	Enzan	refutes	Ryōsui’s	claim.	Even	if	 this	 thinking	process	exists,	both	Enzan	and	Ryōsui	have	 their	own	
minds.	If	one	of	them	were	to	die,	the	mind	of	the	other	would	not	vanish	and	some	substance	would	be	left	behind.	In	other	
words,	 if	all	 things	are	subsumed	into	a	mind,	why	does	discrimination	occur?	Ryōsui	was	unable	to	answer	this	question	
(IES1-39).
	 Similarly,	when	Enzan	expands	his	idea	of	pluralism,	in	which	discrimination	exists	in	everything,	Ryōsui	immediately	
refutes	him.	Ryōsui	asks	whether	there	is	discrimination	between	mind	and	matter,	and	Enzan	responds	in	the	affirmative.	In	
response,	on	the	basis	of	the	fact	that	matter	is	unaware	of	the	distinction	between	mind	and	matter,	Ryōsui	puts	forward	the	
counterargument	that	discrimination	between	mind	and	matter	is	an	action	of	the	mind	(IES1-40).	
	 Ryōsui	furthers	the	counterargument	by	saying	that	at	the	beginning	of	the	universe,	when	there	was	nothing	but	inorganic	
substances,	if	everything	was	destroyed	and	the	universe	“had	nothing,”	discrimination	would	not	be	possible.	This	is	monism	
from	an	evolutionary	standpoint,	which	states	that	organic	substances	created	from	inorganic	matter	and	the	beings	born	with	
minds	will	soon	return	to	nothingness.	The	discrimination	is	produced	by	the	indiscrimination,	and	will	before	long	return	to	
the	indiscrimination	(IES1-41ff).	Enzan	was	unable	to	respond	to	this	counterargument.
	 Thus,	Ryōsui	 reaches	 the	conclusion	 that	“even	 if	he	knows	of	 the	existence	of	 the	 indiscriminate	mind,	he	cannot	
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understand	the	fact	that	there	is	discrimination	between	mind	and	matter	within	that	mind,”	while	Enzan	reaches	the	conclusion	
that	“even	if	he	knows	of	 the	discrimination	between	mind	and	matter,	he	cannot	know	of	 the	 indiscrimination	 to	which	
discrimination	 turns”	(IES1-43).	 If	one	assumes	 there	 is	no	discrimination,	one	cannot	explain	 the	distinction	 that	exists	
between	oneself	and	others;	 if	one	assumes	 there	 is	discrimination,	one	cannot	explain	 that	 there	once	was	or	will	be	
indiscrimination.	Thereupon	Enzan	and	Ryōsui	sought	the	instruction	of	Enryō.
	 On	Enryō’s	great	path	discrimination	and	indiscrimination	are	one.	While	Ryōsui	 tends	 toward	 indiscrimination	and	
Enzan	toward	discrimination,	Enryō	explains	 to	 them	the	coexistence	of	discrimination	and	indiscrimination:	If	one	looks	
through	the	surface,	one	can	know	the	existence	of	the	reverse	side.	If	one	looks	through	the	reverse	side,	one	can	know	the	
existence	of	the	surface.	Furthermore,	the	surface	and	reverse	side	are	not	separate	entities,	but	rather	two	sides	of	a	single	
entity	(IES1-43).	From	the	standpoint	of	matter,	one	can	see	 the	existence	of	 the	non-corporeal	mind;	whereas	from	the	
standpoint	of	 the	mind,	one	can	see	 the	existence	of	matter	as	something	 that	 is	separate	from	the	mind.	However,	 from	
Enzan’s	discrimination	standpoint,	one	cannot	see	that	indiscrimination	is	actually	nothing	more	than	two	sides	of	one	entity.	
Conversely,	from	Ryōsui’s	standpoint,	which	favors	an	indiscriminate	whole,	the	two-sided	discrimination	that	exists	within	
that whole is unknown.
	 Enryō’s	great	path,	which	 thus	 incorporates	discrimination	as	a	whole,	has	a	dynamism	 that	 transposes	 from	 the	
discriminate	to	indiscriminate	and	vice	versa.	Enzan	questions	why	so	few	individuals	presently	know	about	the	principle	of	
indiscrimination;	Enryō	answers	that	it	is	because	discrimination	rises	to	the	surface.	Further,	to	Enzan’s	repeated	question	of	
why	there	was	no	discrimination	in	ancient	times,	Enryō	replies	that	although	there	appeared	to	be	no	discrimination	in	ancient	
times,	the	fact	was	that	indiscrimination	was	only	on	the	surface,	while	discrimination	existed	within.	However,	discrimination	
at	length	rose	to	the	surface.	However,	when	the	world	ends,	indiscrimination	will	again	rise	to	the	surface	(IES1-44f).	Enryō	
expresses	such	progress	from	an	indiscriminate	stage	to	a	discriminate	one	and	the	eventual	movement	of	a	discriminate	stage	
to	an	indiscriminate	one	as	follows:
	 	 The	whole	entity	incorporates	indiscrimination	on	one	side,	and	discrimination	on	the	other.	The	transition	is	made	
through	the	power	of	the	whole	entity.	At	times	the	discriminate	side	is	shown,	while	at	others	the	indiscriminate	side	is	
shown.	It	is	not	known	when	that	change	will	begin	or	when	it	will	end	(IES1-45).
	 The	great	path	advocated	by	Enryō	is	not	based	on	an	indiscriminate	standpoint	(monism)	or	a	discriminate	one	(pluralism),	
but	rather	it	unites	the	two	(one	yet	many).	It	possesses	a	dynamism	that	is	constantly	active	from	the	one	to	the	many	and	from	
the	many	to	the	one.	Enryō	states,	“It	is	always	turning	through	the	power	of	the	whole;	it	does	not	stop	for	a	second.	It	is	one	
great	living	being”	(IES1-47).	Enryō’s	great	path	is	the	dynamism	itself	that	moves	as	one	great	being.
2. Examination of Tetsugaku Issekiwa (Volume 2)
	 Volume	2,	titled	“Discussion	on	the	Substance	of	Divinity,”	discusses	a	debate	between	atheism	and	theism.	Atheism	here	
is	divided	into	materialistic	atheism	and	mentalistic	atheism,	and	theism	is	divided	into	whether	divinity	is	separate	from	mind	
and	matter.	It	is	presented	as	a	discussion	among	four	of	Enryō’s	disciples.
	 Entō	advocates	that	everything	is	derived	from	matter	and	its	energy,	and	he	is	unable	to	answer	the	question,	“Was	matter	
the	element	that	formed	matter?”	(IES1-56).	If	element	was	matter,	then	an	element	must	have	existed	before	matter	to	form	
the	element	 from	which	matter	was	composed.	 If	 that	element	was	not	matter,	how	could	matter	have	been	 formed	by	
something	that	was	not	matter?	He	is	also	unable	to	answer	how	we	could	know	the	energy	within	matter	(IES1-56f).
	 Ryōsei	advocates	 that	everything	exists	within	 the	mind,	and	 is	unable	 to	answer	 the	counterargument	 that	“even	 if	
changes	in	matter	occur	in	thought,	thought	itself	is	powerless	to	change	matter	by	simply	witnessing	change.”	If	changes	in	
matter	are	caused	by	energy	within	a	material,	it	cannot	be	said	that	everything	exists	within	the	mind	(IES1-59f).
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	 Theism	appears	here	as	a	contrast	 to	atheism.	The	“gods”	are	mentioned	as	having	produced	the	worlds	of	mind	and	
matter,	and	are	capable	of	making	changes	in	the	two	worlds.	There	are	two	viewpoints	on	the	relationship	between	the	gods	
and	mind	and	matter.	The	first	perspective	is	that	of	Ennan,	who	believes	that	the	gods	must	exist	as	their	creator	because	mind	
and	matter	exist	and	 that	 the	gods	are	separate	from	mind	and	matter.	However,	 this	perspective,	by	which	 the	gods	are	
assumed	to	exist	outside	of	the	universe,	cannot	answer	the	question	about	a	reality	outside	of	time	and	space.	The	question	
also	arises	of	how	the	gods	created	mind	and	matter.	If	the	gods	brought	materials	from	somewhere	to	create	the	world,	what	
were	these	materials	like	and	where	did	they	come	from?	It	is	difficult	to	believe	that	something	came	out	of	nothing	(IES1-62).	
Therefore,	Ennan	responds	by	saying	“perhaps	the	gods	used	part	of	themselves	to	create	the	universe”	(IES1-62).	However,	if	
the	gods	used	themselves	to	create	everything,	mind	and	matter	cannot	be	said	to	be	separate	from	the	gods.
	 By	contrast,	Ryōhoku	holds	the	viewpoint	that	parts	of	the	gods	are	within	and	outside	the	universe.	The	parts	that	are	
within	the	universe	can	be	known,	while	the	parts	outside	the	universe	are	unknown.	However,	he	is	unable	to	answer	why	
there	would	be	unknowable	gods	instead	of	knowable	gods	(IES1-63f).	Ryōhoku	stated,	“I	have	known	for	the	first	time	now	
that	the	substance	of	the	gods,	the	entirety	of	which	comprises	mind	and	matter,	cannot	exist	separate	from	this	world”	(IES1-
64).
	 At	this	point,	the	opinions	of	the	four	disciples	are	suddenly	in	agreement.	First,	Entō,	the	materialistic	atheist,	says	that	
his	own	theory	agrees	with	Ryōhoku’s	theory	that	mind	and	matter	comprise	the	entirety	of	the	gods.	Moreover,	although	Entō	
says	that	there	is	no	mind	without	matter,	this	does	not	mean	that	there	is	no	discrimination	at	all.	The	movement	of	the	“one	
great	living	being”	produces	various	discriminations,	giving	rise	to	various	dispositions	as	well.	Entō	calls	the	dynamism	of	the	
“one	great	living	being,”	which	enables	this	discrimination,	the	“substance	of	indiscrimination,”	but	he	asserts	that	if	it	were	
called	“the	gods,”	it	would	be	identical	to	Ryōhoku’s	theory	(IES1-64).
	 Ryōsei,	who	advocates	mentalistic	atheism,	also	claims	 to	agree	with	 the	 theories	of	Ryōhoku	and	Entō.	Even	 if	
everything	exists	within	the	mind,	it	does	not	mean	that	discrimination	does	not	exist;	the	indiscriminate	impartial	mind	exists,	
as	do	the	discriminate	mind	and	matter.	If	these	were	called	“the	gods”	or	“the	substance	of	indiscrimination,”	then	his	theory	
would	match	those	of	Ryōhoku’s	and	Entō’s	(IES1-64).
	 Furthermore,	Ennan	also	claims	to	have	a	theory	that	coincides	with	this.	If	the	gods,	as	an	impartial	mind,	are	distinct	
from	the	discriminate	mind	and	matter,	then	the	gods	can	be	considered	as	being	outside	of	the	discriminate	mind	and	matter.	
He	asserts	that	this	does	not	contradict	his	own	theory	that	the	gods	exist	outside	of	mind	and	matter	(IES1-64f).
	 Ryōhoku	also	asserts	that	his	initial	 theory	that	parts	of	the	gods	exist	outside	of	mind	and	matter	and	another	parts	of	
gods	exist	within	mind	and	matter	was	not	mistaken.	If	 there	is	a	division	between	the	impartial	mind	and	the	discriminate	
mind	and	matter,	then	the	gods	exist	outside	of	mind	and	matter;	if	the	impartial	mind	is	the	essence	of	discriminate	mind	and	
matter,	then	the	gods	exist	within	mind	and	matter	(IES1-65).
	 On	the	basis	of	 this	agreement	 in	opinion,	 the	four	disciples	sought	 the	opinion	of	Enryō.	However,	Enryō	does	not	
confirm	the	veracity	of	any	one	opinion,	but	 instead	warns	 that	“absolute	 truth	can	only	be	found	by	combining	all	 four	
theories”	(IES1-65).	The	four	disciples	are	not	to	favor	any	one	theory,	but	to	find	the	middle	road,	the	“path	of	Enryō.”	In	
corporeal	terms,	the	“path	of	Enryō”	is	materialism;	in	ethereal	terms,	it	is	mentalism;	in	spiritual	terms,	it	is	theism.	The	“path	
of	Enryō”	has	a	body	that	is	“neither	arising	nor	ceasing,”	“neither	increasing	nor	decreasing,”	“neither	beginning	nor	ending,”	
and	“boundless	and	unlimited”	(the	body	of	Enryō);	from	the	power	of	that	body	emanates	“innumerable”	changes	(the	power	
of	Enryō);	within	it	are	shown	all	areas	of	discrimination,	which	together	return	to	the	principle	of	indiscrimination	(the	great	
change	of	Enryō).	Thus,	the	fact	that	Enryō’s	path	is	considered	to	be	endowed	with	the	power	to	transpose	by	itself	and	to	
return	to	indiscrimination	while	creating	discrimination,	is	of	particular	importance	to	the	discussion	in	this	paper	(IES1-67).
3. Examination of Tetsugaku Issekiwa (Volume 3)
	 Volume	3,	titled	“Discussion	on	the	Nature	of	Truth,”	deals	with	the	subject	of	how	truth	should	be	considered.	Enten	
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argues	for	empirical	truth;	Ryōchi	argues	for	mentalistic	truth;	Ryōin	argues	that	truth	is	the	consistency	between	the	internal	
and	external;	Enyō	argues	that	truth	is	founded	on	“the	gods.”
	 Enten	takes	a	standpoint	that	truth	comprises	simple	and	axiomatic	rules	that	develop	into	more	complex	rules.	The	simple	
and	axiomatic	rules	can	be	experienced	by	anyone	whose	intellect	develops.	However,	the	counterargument	exists	that	if	truth	
is	based	on	experience,	 it	cannot	be	eternally	constant.	A	further	counterargument	exists	 that	drawing	a	boundary	between	
simple	and	complex	rules	requires	criteria	for	truth	to	determine	that	the	simple	rules	are	indeed	simple	rules.	Enten	was	unable	
to	answer	these	counterarguments	(IES1-71ff.).
	 Ryōchi	asserts	 that	 the	basis	of	 truth	 is	“thought.”	However,	 thought	can	also	be	mistaken;	 therefore,	 there	are	 three	
principles	of	thought-truth:	 the	law	of	identity,	 the	law	of	contradiction,	and	the	law	of	excluded	middle.	However,	he	was	
unable	 to	answer	 the	counterargument	 that	 these	principles	could	not	 stand	without	 the	experience	of	uniformity	or	a	
contradiction	between	things	(IES1-76).
	 Ryōin	 takes	a	standpoint	 that	 truth	exists	where	external	experience	and	 internal	 thought	coincide.	This	standpoint	
advocates	that	there	is	an	inductive	method	of	gaining	truth	through	external	experiences	and	a	deductive	method	of	viewing	
the	state	of	external	elements	through	internal	truth,	and	that	truth	exists	where	the	two	are	in	agreement.	However,	he	was	
unable	 to	accurately	answer	Enten’s	counterargument	 that	 internal	 thought-truth	is	derived	from	external	experiences,	and	
Ryōchi’s	counterargument	that	all	external	truth	is	also	known	through	internal	thought	(IES1-79).
	 Last,	Enyō	asserts	that	because	neither	the	external	(matter)	nor	the	internal	(mind)	can	be	a	standard	of	truth,	the	basis	of	
truth	must	be	the	gods,	who	exist	outside	of	mind	and	matter.	However,	the	truth	of	mind	and	matter	cannot	be	determined	
simply	by	existing	outside	of	mind	and	matter;	therefore,	certain	rules	of	the	gods	must	exist	within	mind	and	matter.	If	that	is	
the	case,	the	basis	of	truth	is	within	the	world	of	mind	and	matter.	This	poses	the	question	of	why	the	gods,	who	explicitly	
cannot	be	known,	must	exist	outside	of	mind	and	matter	(IES1-80).
	 With	the	argument	thus	coming	to	an	impasse,	the	disciples	decide	to	ask	for	Enryō’s	advice	(IES1-81ff.).	Enryō	explains	
that	the	four	disciples	have	not	reached	“logical	impartiality,”	and	advocates	the	truth	through	the	great	path	of	Enryō.	There	is	
no	separation	between	the	phenomenal	world	and	its	substance	(the	non-phenomenal:	 the	substance	of	mind,	substance	of	
matter,	and	substance	of	divinity);	phenomenal	or	non-phenomenal,	mind	or	matter,	all	are	one	entity.	On	the	great	path	of	
Enryō,	all	 is	truth.	However,	the	great	path	has	a	department	of		indiscrimination	and	a	department	of	discrimination;	at	the	
department	of	discrimination,	there	is	a	distinction	between	truth	and	untruth.	This	requires	a	standard	for	truth,	but	one	that	is	
relative	to	the	situation.	This	is	why	each	of	the	four	disciples	has	his	own	position	on	relative	truth.	However,	“as	one	moves	
forward	and	reaches	the	standard	within	the	standards,	one	sees	the	existence	of	something	not	easily	given	to	change.	One	
sees	the	principle	of	impartiality	within	the	department	of	discrimination;	that	which	changes	takes	this	as	a	relative	standard;	
that	which	does	not	change	takes	this	as	an	absolute	standard;	one	advances	from	the	relative	to	the	absolute.	This	is	called	the	
evolution	of	the	standard”	(IES1-83).	By	drawing	out	the	relative	standpoint	to	its	fullest	extent,	one	eventually	reaches	the	
standard	of	absolute	truth	and	returns	to	the	great	path	of	Enryō.	It	is	noteworthy	that	a	standpoint	of	discrimination	evolves	
into	one	that	is	absolute,	as	indicated	through	the	“evolution	of	the	standard,”	This	indicates	that	there	is	no	separation	between	
the	relative	and	absolute	standpoints	and	that	the	absolute	is	considered	to	be	the	dynamism	that	progresses	from	relative	to	
absolute.
4. Links between Enryō Inoue’s Tetsugaku Issekiwa and Kitarō Nishida’s An Inquiry into the Good
	 As	outlined	above,	Enryō	Inuoe’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	depicts	the	great	path	of	Enryō	as	the	dynamism	that	moves	from	
the	 indiscriminate	 to	 the	discriminate	and	vice	versa,	and	from	the	relative	 to	 the	absolute.	Characteristically,	 it	aims	for	
impartiality	rather	than	favoring	a	particular	standpoint.	The	aiming	for	 impartiality	is	also	expressed	as	“the	great	path	of	
Enryō.”	In	regard	to	associating	the	great	path	with	his	own	name—great	path	of	Enryō—in	the	preface	to	the	Volume	2,	Enryō	
stated	that,	“I	had	no	choice	but	to	use	my	own	name,	as	I	could	not	reuse	the	terms	used	by	ancient	Buddhism”	(IES1-48).	
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Had	he	used	the	term	tathātā,	for	example,	it	would	have	been	taken	as	favoring	the	Buddhist	doctrine,	and	would	have	run	the	
risk	of	being	partial7. Throughout Tetsugaku Issekiwa,	Enryō	persistently	aims	for	metaphysics	as	pure	philosophy,	having	no	
wish	that	it	be	considered	as	a	bias	toward	Buddhism.
	 In	contrast	to	Enryō’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa,	what	philosophy	did	Nishida	aim	to	promote?	In	this	paper	we	do	not	examine	
Nishida’s	philosophy	in	detail;	however,	the	bare	essentials	of	it	can	be	seen	in	his	first	philosophical	work,	An Inquiry into the 
Good8. 
	 Nishida’s	An Inquiry into the Good	speaks	of	pure	experience.	His	famous	words	are	found	at	the	beginning	of	An Inquiry 
into the Good:	“The	moment	of	seeing	a	color	or	hearing	a	sound,	for	example,	is	prior	not	only	to	the	thought	that	the	color	or	
sound	is	the	activity	of	an	external	object	or	that	one	is	sensing	it,	but	also	to	the	judgment	of	what	the	color	or	sound	migiht	
be”	(NKZ1-9).	The	state	of	no	distinction	between	subjective	and	objective	is	called	pure	experience.	However,	this	does	not	
simply	mean	instantaneous	perception	of	an	instant.	Pure	experience	is	something	that	moves.	“We	can	shift	our	attention	to	a	
state	of	no	distinction	between	subjective	and	objective	without	the	slightest	thought.	For	example,	like	climbing	a	cliff	with	all	
of	one’s	might,	or	a	musician	playing	a	well-practiced	piece,	this	continual	perception	can	all	be	called	a	perceptual	train	(Stout,	
Manual of Psychology,	p.	252)”	(NKZ1-11).	When	the	musician	plays	the	violin,	the	musician	is	not	necessarily	aware	that	he	
is	a	musician	or	is	playing	a	violin.	The	musician	is	immersed	in	playing	the	song;	likewise,	the	violin	is	not	aware	that	it	is	an	
object.	There	 is	no	distinction	between	 the	“subject”	playing	 the	violin	and	 the	“object”	being	played;	 thus,	 the	state	or	
performance	progresses	and	the	structure	or	song	takes	shape.	Nishida	states	that	“even	those	who	seem	to	have	instantaneous	
perception	cannot	always	stay	this	way;	for	example,	one	believes	that	one	sees	the	entirety	of	an	object	at	a	glance,	but	it	is	
not	until	one	examines	the	object	in	further	detail	that	one	can	know	the	entirety	of	it,	as	the	attention	naturally	shifts	with	the	
movement	of	the	eye”	(NKZ1-12f.),	indicating	that	even	instantaneous	perception	is	a	system	in	itself.	Even	if	he	believes	that	
we	perceive	the	entirety	of	an	object	in	an	instant,	the	perception	made	within	the	eye’s	movement	of	the	object	and	the	action	
therein	already	forms	a	continuous	system.
	 Thus,	pure	experience	is	an	action	that	comprises	a	continuous	system.	Moreover,	there	are	two	states	of	being	within	this	
action:	contradiction	and	unity.	Nishida	stated	the	following.
	 	 In	the	establishment	of	reality,	it	is	necessary	to	have	unity	at	the	root,	as	previously	mentioned,	as	well	as	reciprocal	
antagonism,	or	 rather	contradiction.	Like	Heraclitus’s	assertion	 that	contention	 is	 the	 father	of	all	 things,	 reality	 is	
established	by	contradiction.	Something	red	contrasts	with	something	that	is	not	red;	the	working	is	established	in	contrast	to	
the	one	for	whom	the	work	is	done.	When	this	contradiction	disappears,	reality	also	disappears.	Contradiction	and	unity	are	
essentially	nothing	more	than	two	sides	of	the	same	coin;	there	is	contradiction	because	there	is	unity,	and	there	is	unity	
because	there	is	contradiction	(NKZ1-68f.).
	 This	means	that	just	as	the	color	red	results	from	its	relationship	with	a	color	that	is	not	red,	i.e.,	where	unity	occurs,	a	
contradiction	will	also	be	included.	Furthermore,	this	also	means	that	the	occurrence	of	red	in	a	contradictory	relationship	with	
other	 colors	occurs	within	 the	 system	of	 colors	 as	 a	unit.	The	establishment	of	unity	 as	 a	whole	 incorporates	much	
contradiction;	conversely,	much	contradiction	establishes	unity	as	a	whole9.	Nishida	therefore	makes	the	following	statement:	
	 	 A	reality	that	is	truly	one	yet	many	must	be	constantly	moving	of	itself.	A	state	of	stillness	is	a	state	of	independence,	
free	of	conflict	with	others;	that	is,	a	state	of	one	that	eliminates	the	many.	However,	reality	cannot	be	established	in	this	
state.	If	a	state	of	oneness	were	established	through	unity,	another	state	of	conflict	would	have	to	be	established	immediately.	
Moreover,	 if	 the	unity	of	one	were	established,	disunity	would	 immediately	be	established	 to	break	 it	up.	As	 I	have	
mentioned,	true	reality	is	established	through	endless	conflict	(NKZ1-70).
	 For	Kitarō	Nishida,	pure	experience	is	being	endowed	with	a	moving	dynamism	that	incorporates	both	contradiction	and	
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unity.	Being	in	a	state	of	unity	is	having	already	been	in	a	state	of	contradiction	and	advancing	toward	further	unity	through	
that	contradiction.	Thus,	it	always	moves	from	unity	to	greater	unity	while	incorporating	contradiction.	Contradiction	and	unity	
do	not	exist	independently;	they	form	a	single	dynamism.	As	mentioned,	it	is	constantly	moving	of	itself;	it	continues	to	move	
by	means	of	its	own	power.
	 From	the	above	discussion,	there	is	clearly	some	similarity	between	Kitarō	Nishida’s	“pure	experience”	and	Enryō’s	“great	
path	of	Enryō.”	Both	Enryō’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	and	Kitarō	Nishida’s	An Inquiry into the Good,	address	the	issues	such	as	
discrimination	and	indiscrimination,	the	one	and	the	many,	contradiction	and	unity,	and	the	one	dynamism	wherein	there	is	no	
separation	between	the	 two.	They	do	not	 treat	discrimination	and	indiscrimination,	or	contradiction	and	unity,	as	separate	
entities,	both	are	viewed	together	as	two	sides	of	a	single	movement.	In	terms	of	his	view	on	the	dynamism	of	movement	in	
which	the	one	and	the	many	become	one,	Kitarō	Nishida’s	An Inquiry into the Good	could	be	said	to	be	an	extension	of	Enryō	
Inoue’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa.
	 In	addition,	of	 importance	is	 the	fact	 that	neither	Enryō’s	“great	path”	nor	Nishida’s	“pure	experience”	is	a	 term	with	
Buddhist	origins.	Although	both	Enryō	and	Nishida	had	Buddhist	influences,	they	both	tried	to	construct	metaphysics	and	pure	
philosophy	that	are	distinct	from	Buddhism.
	 Since	Kitarō	Nishida	himself	makes	no	mention	of	Enryō	Inoue	or	Tetsujirō	Inoue	 in	his	philosophical	works,	 it	 is	
difficult	to	consider	a	direct	influential	connection.	However,	Nishida	can	at	least	be	accounted	for	a	part	of	Meiji	philosophy	
inspired	by	Enryō.
Conclusion
	 This	paper	has	presented	an	overview	of	Enryō	Inoue’s	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	and	examined	its	links	with	Kitarō	Nishida’s	
An Inquiry into the Good.	Just	as	Enryō	considered	dynamism	between	discrimination	on	the	one	hand,	and	indiscrimination	to	
be	the	“great	path	of	Enryō”	in	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	on	the	other,	Nishida	considered	pure	experience	to	be	the	dynamism	of	
contradiction	and	unity	in	An Inquiry into the Good.	In	the	sense	of	treating	reality	as	being	two-sided	and	moving	the	entity	
made	up	of	the	one	and	the	many,	Nishida’s	philosophy	is	said	to	be	a	continuation	of	Enryō	Inoue’s	philosophy.
	 Nishida	writes,	“I	do	not	know	what	influenced	me,	but	from	very	early	on	I	thought	that	reality	as	it	is	had	to	be	the	truth,	
that	the	so-called	material	world	is	nothing	more	than	what	we	perceive	it	 to	be.	I	still	remember	being	lost	in	my	thoughts	
walking	the	streets	of	Kanazawa	as	if	I	was	dreaming	when	I	was	still	at	Senior	High	School”	(NKZ1-4).	This	concept	of	
reality	being	“the	reality	as	it	is”	was	not	motionless	and	unchanging	when	it	emerged	complete	as	“pure	experience.”	It	moved	
with	contradictions	within	it	and	formed	a	single	system.	We	do	not	know	whether	Nishida	thought	“reality	has	to	be	the	truth	
as	it	is”	when	he	read	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	in	Senior	High	School.	It	seems	more	likely	that	it	was	because	he	thought	this	way	
that	he	felt	so	deeply	the	impact	of	Tetsugaku Issekiwa.	Nevertheless,	An Inquiry into the Good	and	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	can	be	
thought	of	as	a	successive	flow	of	a	single	philosophy	that	perceives	reality	as	a	moving	dynamism	with	two	sides:	the	one	and	
the many.
	 However,	 there	 is	a	need	 to	analyze	whether	 this	continuity	can	be	considered	as	part	of	 the	pedigree	of	“theory	of	
phenomena	as	reality,”	mentioned	by	Shinichi	Funayama.	Enryō	himself	does	not	use	 the	 term	“theory	of	phenomena	as	
reality.”	Moreover,	a	comparison	of	it	with	Tetsujirō	Inoue’s	philosophy,	an	advocate	of	both	Enryō’s	philosophy	and	“theory	
of	phenomena	as	reality,”	as	well	as	an	examination	of	Enryō’s	philosophy	in	its	entirety	is	required.	Of	more	importance	is	the	
comparison	of	Kitarō	Nishida’s	and	Tetsujirō	Inoue’s	philosophy.
	 While	Kitarō	Nishida’s	and	Enryō	Inoue’s	philosophy	share	common	aspects,	 there	are	also	clear	differences.	Further	
study	is	required	to	ascertain	whether	these	differences	are	conclusive,	or	whether	they	indicate	completion	or	a	subjugation	of	
Enryō’s	philosophy10.
	 Since	we	limit	this	paper	to	concepts	of	immediate	liaison,	these	shall	be	discussed	in	detail	at	a	later	opportunity.
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Legend
1.	 Citations	to	Enryō	Inoue	are	taken	from	Selected Works of Enryō Inoue,	edited	by	the	Toyo	University	100th	Anniversary	Papers	Editorial	
Committee,	Toyo	University,	1987–2004,	in	the	format	of	(IES	volume	number,	page	number).	Citations	to	Kitarō	Nishida	are	taken	from	
The Complete Works of Kitarō Nishida,	edited	by	Klaus	Riesenhuber	et	al.,	Iwanami	Shoten,	2002–2009,	in	the	format	of	(NKZ	volume	
number,	page	number).
2.	 Other	citations	in	the	document	body	and	the	footnotes	are	given	as:	(Name	of	author,	year	of	publication:	page	number).	The	works	in	
question	are	citied	in	the	reference	list	below.	Where	a	reference	has	been	made	to	a	compilation	or	a	revised	edition,	the	date	of	its	first	
publication	is	given	in	parentheses,	beside	the	name	of	the	work	in	the	reference	list,	with	the	new	date	indicated	by	an	arrow	→ in the 
main	text	references.	In	these	instances,	the	page	number	indicates	that	of	the	revised	work	given	in	the	reference	list.
3.	 Suspension	points	within	a	citation	(…)	indicate	ellipsis.	Any	author’s	note	added	to	a	citation	is	indicated	within	parentheses	and	clearly	
specified.
Notes
1	 The	first	edition	of	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	(Volume	1)	was	published	in	July	1887;	the	first	edition	of	Volume	3	was	published	in	April	1888.
2	 Enryō	stated	that,	“I	decided	to	write	several	volumes	of	Tetsugaku Issekiwa	with	the	desire	to	demonstrate	these	metaphysical	questions	
and	explanations	to	those	who	know	nothing	at	all	of	philosophy”	(IES1-34).
3	 Shinichi	Funayama	stated,	“Nishida’s	logic	is	a	development	and	completion	of	theory	of	phenomena	as	reality	of	Enryō	Inoue,	Tetsujirō	
Inoue,	Yūjirō	Miyake,	and	Manshi	Kiyosawa”	(Funayama,	1959-1999:60),	and	“Meiji	philosophy	made	a	departure	from	Nishi	Amane;	its	
idealism	was	established	by	Tetsujirō	 Inuoe	and	perfected	by	Kitarō	Nishida”	 (Funayama,	1959-1999:75).	Regarding	Enryō	Inoue,	
Funayama	stated,	“…	his	[Enryō	Inoue]	theory	of	phenomena	as	reality	was	the	earliest	it	to	appear	in	the	Meiji	Period,	yet	it	was	the	most	
representative	and	the	simplest”	(Funayama,	1959-1999:108).
4	 In	his	personal	journal,	Nishida	always	refers	to	Tetsujirō	Inoue	by	the	reverential	title	of	“teacher.”	Nishida’s	daughter	Shizuko	also	stated,	
“I	remember	hearing	the	word	‘teacher’	from	my	father’s	mouth	and	wondering	whether	he	meant	Prof.	Hōjō,	Dr.	Koeber,	or	Tetsujirō	
Inoue”	(Shizuko	Nishida,	1948:9f).	However,	in	a	1908	letter	to	Yūji	Tanabe,	he	stated,	“I	do	not	have	much	admiration	for	Inoue’s	work.	I	
had	spoken	ill	of	teacher	Inoue	and	been	rude	to	him”	(NKZ19-135).	Again,	in	a	1922	letter	to	Tokuryū	Yamauchi,	he	remarked,	“I	am	
jealous	that	Mr.	Inoue	bought	the	complete	works	of	Bolzano.	I	cannot	help	but	feel	that	it	 is	a	little	like	throwing	pearls	before	swine”	
(NKZ20-40).
5	 A	commentary	on	selections	from	Enryō	Inoue	also	had	mentioned	that	“the	two	disciples	make	their	arguments	from	the	standpoints	of	
materialism	and	mentalism”	(IES1-428).
6	 Akihira	Ogura	also	pointed	out	that	Enzan	advocates	a	corporeal-mind	dualism	(Ogura,	2009:70).
7	 Katsuhito	Inoue	asserts	 that	Enryō’s	 theory	of	phenomena	as	reality	 took	shape	under	 the	 influence	of	Tanzan	Hara’s	 lectures	on	 the	
Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna	(Inoue,	2011:159).	Indeed,	certain	elements	could	be	considered	as	having	Buddhist	origins,	such	as	
the	figurative	speech	of	water	and	waves.	However,	it	must	be	noted	that	the	work	aimed	at	impartiality	and	did	not	focus	exclusively	on	
the	Buddhist	standpoint.	“We	hear	that	Tanzan	Hara	is	a	university	philosophy	teacher	and	Buddhism	scholar.	It	shall	be	that	Buddhism	is	
philosophy”	(IES1-33)—Katsuhito	Inoue	also	uses	the	statement	from	the	preface	of	Volume	1	to	support	the	claim	that	Enryō’s	Tetsugaku 
Issekiwa	was	based	on	the	Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna.	However,	this	statement	is	given	to	exemplify	that	there	are	people	who	
think	of	philosophy	as	“psychology,	Confucianism,	and	Buddhism.”	Enryō’s	response	and	attempt	 to	demonstrate	pure	philosophy	is	
Tetsugaku Issekiwa.
8	 For	a	detailed	exposition	of	Kitarō	Nishida’s	An Inquiry into the Good,	see	(Shirai,	2011:121ff.).
9	 Satomi	Takahashi	criticizes	 the	viewing	of	unity	and	contradiction	as	a	single	state	of	pure	experience	by	deeming	it	as	“diluting	and	
adulterating	pure	experience	without	knowing	or	understanding	it.	He	believed	that	he	was	advocating	this,	but	in	fact	he	was	repudiating	
it”	(Takahashi,	1912-1973:162).	He	disapproved	of	the	assertion	that	pure	experience	as	a	state	of	unity	without	informed	judgment	can	
also	incorporate	disunity.	For	Nishida’s	response	to	this,	see	Response to a Criticism of My Work: An Inquiry into  the Good	by	Satomi	
Takahashi,	B.A.	(NKZ1-299ff.).
10	 Yoshihiro	Nitta	compares	Tetsujirō	Inoue’s	to	Enryō	Inoue’s	philosophy	and	assesses	that	Enryō	is	a	step	ahead	in	terms	of	perceiving	
reality	as	dynamism	(Nitta,	1988:80).	Nitta	states,	“In	pursuing	the	later	developments	of	theory	of	phenomena	as	reality	in	modern	Japan,	
we	see	that	it	was	left	undeveloped	in	Enryō’s	philosophy;	however,	this	was	finally	and	thoroughly	developed	in	Kitarō	Nishida’s	idea	of	
‘self-determination’”	(Nitta,	1988:99).
259Journal of International Philosophy No.1 2012
References
Funayama,	Shinichi.	Meiji Tetsugaku-shi Kenkyū	[A Study on the History of Meiji Philosophy]	(1959),	Funayama Shinichi Chosaku-shū 
[Collected	works	of	Shinichi	Funayama],	Volume	6,	Kobushi	Shobo,	1999.
Inoue,	Katsuhito.	Nishida Kitarō to Meiji no Seishin	[Kitarō Nishia and the Meiji Spirit],	Kansai	University	Press,	2011.
Kōsaka,	Masaaki.	“Nishida	Kitarō	Sensei	no	Shōgai	to	Shisō	[The	Life	and	Thought	of	Kitarō	Nishida]”	(1947),	Kōsaka Masaaki Kencho 
Sakushū	[The Complete Works of Masaaki Kōsaka],	Volume	8,	Rishosha,	1965.
Nishida,	Sachiko.	“Chichi	[Father],”	 in	Nishida,	Sachiko	and	Yayoi,	Ueda.	Waga Chichi Nishida Kitarō	 [Our Father, Kitarō Nishida],	
Kobundo,	1948.
Nitta,	Yoshihiro.	“Inoue	Enryō	no	Genshō	Shoku	Jitsuzai-ron	[The	Theory	of	phenomena	as	reality	of	Enryō	Inoue],”	in	Saito,	Shigeo	ed.	
Inoue Enryō to Seiyō Shisō	 [Enryō Inoue and Western Thought],	Toyo	University	Enryō	Inoue	Memorial	Fund	for	 the	Promotion	of	
Scholarship,	1988.
Shirai,	Masato.	“Junsui	Keiken	no	‘Jijitsu’	towa	Nani	ka?	[What	Is	the	‘Fact’	of	Pure	Experience?]”	Tetsugaku Ronshū	[Collected Essays 
on Philosophy],	Volume	40,	Sophia	University	Philosophical	Society,	2011.
Ogura,	Akihiro.	“‘Tetsugaku	Issekiwa’	Dai-Ippen	ni	Mirareru	Inoue	Enryō	no	Chūdō	Tetsugaku	[Enryō	Inoue’s	Middle	Way	Philosophy	as	
seen	in	‘Tetsugaku	Issekiwa’	Volume	1],”	Bulletin of the Kansai University Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies,	Volume	42,	Kansai	
University	Institute	of	Oriental	and	Occidental	Studies,	2009.
Takahashi,	Satomi.	“Ishiki	Genshō	no	Jijitsu	to	Sono	Imi	[The	Fact	and	Meaning	of	Conscious	Phenomena]”	(1912),	Takahashi Satomi 
Zenshū	[The Complete Works of Satomi Takahashi],	Volume	4,	Fukumura	Shuppan,	1973.
Yusa,	Michiko.	Denki Nishida Kitarō	[Biography of Kitarō Nishida],	Nishida Kitarō Tetsugaku Senshū	[Selected Philosophical Works of 
Nishida],	Supplementary	Volume	1,	Toeisha,	1998.
